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Abstract 
 
In recent times, Indian banks have resorted to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the expectation 
to reap efficiency gains brought in by such strategies. This paper explores the impact of M&A on 
technical efficiency of Indian commercial banks during the second decade (2000-2010) of 
reforms. We use DEA to compute the relative technical efficiency of banks that participated in 
M&A activities. The technical efficiency is computed under both common and separate frontier 
with the assumption of constant as well as variable returns to scale. We also compare the post-
amalgamation efficiency scores of the participating banks with that of a control group comprising 
of such banks that did not undergo any consolidation since 1991. Our results indicate evidence of 
efficiency gains for the merging and/or acquiring banks. At the same time there are banks that 
have experienced deterioration in their post-M&A average efficiency levels. It would be wise for 
the banks to carefully consider the potential gains as well as threats posed by M&A before 
venturing into such activities.  
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Efficiency of Indian Commercial Banks:  
The Post-Reform Experience from Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a means of  modern corporate restructuring strategies have 
been increasingly resorted to in recent times to reap different forms of strategic benefits (viz. cost 
efficiencies, maximization of shareholders’ value, synergies, etc.). Financial innovations have also 
fuelled consolidation activities. Commercial banks across the world have resorted to M&A in 
expectation to enhance efficiency gains through such consolidation strategies. In recent past, just 
after the massive sub-prime crisis when the world had witnessed a global financial meltdown that 
engulfed some of the giant advanced economies, there has been much emphasis on the efficiency 
of the commercial banks.  
 
We focus on M&A that had taken place in the Indian commercial banking sector and the gamut of 
challenges and opportunities that such shake outs and restructuring brought in to the banks. In this 
context, a central issue has been whether M&A enhanced efficiency of the Indian commercial 
banks. The post-liberalization era of banking sector reforms had opened up fierce competition 
among inter and intra-bank groups in India. The cutthroat competition has resulted in new 
challenges especially for the public sector banks to hold back their market share, retention of the 
consumer base and creation of a new customer base.  
 
The objective here is to explore the pre and post-M&A performance of Indian banks when there 
had been number of measures (e.g., interest rate deregulation, operational autonomy, etc.) that 
were taken towards the financial market reforms. The itinerary of the paper is as follows. Section 
2 evaluates recent performance of the banks with respect to certain parameters. Section 3 
discusses amalgamation among commercial banks and issues related to concentration in the 
banking sector. Section 4 mentions the extant empirical literature followed by discussion on 
research methodology, data and variables in Section 5. Empirical results are reported in Section 6. 
Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 7. 
 
2.  Performance of Scheduled Commercial Banks 
The banking sector in India is largely dominated by the public sector banks (PSBs) that account 
for nearly 70 percent of the banking assets.i In particular, the commercial banks account for 
majority of the total assets of India’s financial landscape which in turn is largely dominated by the 
scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). The fast pace of deposits growth can be viewed from the 
fact that over a year time (2009 to 2010) total bank deposits increased by 48.6 percent. Not only 
that, the total advances and investments made by the SCBs grew at an impressive rate of 16.5 
percent and 18.6 percent respectively, during the same period. Latest available statistics reveal 
that the new private sector banks have registered the highest growth rate at 20.8 percent in the 
3 
 
branch network during 2009-10 while SCBs as a whole marked 7 percent expansion in their total 
branch network during the same period. All commercial banks have migrated to Basel II 
framework for maintaining their regulatory capital. During the year 2010, the capital base of all 
SCBs increased by 16.9 percent over the previous year. ROA has been higher than the benchmark 
(1 percent) in 12 public sector and 14 private sector banks.ii These figures portray that since the 
initiation of financial sector reforms in early 1990s, private and foreign banks have carved a niche 
for themselves in the Indian financial system. These banks also started setting new standard for 
the entire banking sector in terms of capital adequacy, return on capital and profit per employee, 
etc.iii The World Economic Forum in its Financial Development Index (2008) credits the gradual 
reforms and prudential regulations for the reasonable stability of the Indian banking system.  
 
Table 1 quickly assess the performance of the different commercial bank groups at three different 
years — 1991, representing the initiation of the reform process, 2002 after a decade of reform 
process and 2010 for the recent performance.iv The table reveals the dismal performance of all the 
different bank groups on the eve of the reforms; however, the private banks had an edge over 
others. Since 1991, profit per employee has consistently increased and cost-income ratio has 
shown a secular fall across all the bank groups. 
 
Table 1: Profitability and Cost Based Indicators of Efficiency 
 
 Net Profit per Employee (Rs. ‘000)   Cost-Income Ratio (in percent) 
Bank Groups 1991 2002 2010 1991 2002 2010 
SBI & Associates 5.04 121.43 465.06 94.46 52.11 50.27 
Nationalized Banks 4.76 102.58 566.82 93.89 56.65 44.14 
Private Banks 7.42 170.94 719.28 92.63 51.46 43.73 
Average 5.74 131.65 583.72 93.66 53.40 46.04 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Database on Indian Banking 1987-98, IBA (1999) and Performance Highlights of 
Public Sector Banks, IBA (various issues). 
 
 
Note: The cost-income ratio is ratio of operating cost (non-interest expense) to net total income (total income minus 
interest expense).  
 
Table 1.1 reveals that on the eve of liberalization programs, the ratio of unsecured advances to 
total advances (a proxy for loan quality) increased substantially for SBI (by 47.3 percent) and 
private sector banks (74.6 percent) while the associates of SBI and other nationalized banks 
reported a marginal decline. This highlights the increased level of risk faced by the Indian banks. 
  
Table 1.1: Loan Quality of Commercial Banks 
 Unsecured Advances/ Total Advances (in percent) 
Bank/Bank Groups 1988 1989 1990 1991 
SBI 16.50 19.80 20.96 24.31 
Associates of SBI 5.34 4.90 5.41 4.64 
Nationalized Banks 11.90 11.52 10.99 9.39 
Private Banks 5.41 5.70 7.86 9.45 
   Source: Authors’ calculation based on Performance Highlights of Public Sector Banks, IBA (1987-98). 
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Financial repression best describes the state of banking sector until the dawn of the era of liberal 
economic policies in India. The banking sector had remained shielded from foreign competition 
consequent of the various restrictive policies in place. An imminent need for improvement in 
efficiency of Indian banks was recognized and subsequently RBI started focusing its policies in 
pursuit of capital adequacy and profitability of the banks. The banking sector reforms were aimed 
at ushering efficiency and stability in Indian banking sector.  
 
Table 2.1 and 2.2 represent the ratio of net profit to total assets of the public and private sector 
banks respectively, for the last decade.v There is an overall improvement in terms of profitability 
for both the bank groups as indicated by their average values. However, the PSBs have 
experienced a better improvement; 13 of the 21 PSBs (including the SBI group) ended with a 
higher net profit to assets ratio in 2010. Amongst the private sector banks, there are few whose 
performances have deteriorated. Most of such banks were either acquired or merged primarily due 
to their dismal performance. In total, 23 banks (public and private) participated in M&A of which 
4 PSBs [Bank of Baroda, IDBI, PNB and SBI] and 3 private banks [Federal bank, ICICI bank and 
HDFC] have improved their profitability in the post-merger period. 
 
Table 2.1: Net Profit/Total Assets (in percent) of Public Sector Banks 
Source: Performance Highlight of Public Sector Banks, IBA (Various Issues). 
Note: IDBI Bank was established in the year 2004.  
 
Banks 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Allahabad Bank 0.32 0.59 1.34 1.20 1.28 1.11 1.18 0.79 0.99 
Andhra Bank 0.97 1.63 1.72 1.59 1.19 1.13 1.02 0.95 1.16 
Bank of Baroda 0.77 1.01 1.14 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.8 0.98 1.1 
Bank of India 0.72 1.12 1.19 0.36 0.62 0.79 1.12 1.33 0.63 
Bank of Maharashtra 0.68 0.89 0.95 0.54 0.16 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.62 
Canara Bank 1.03 1.24 1.34 1.01 1.01 0.86 0.87 0.94 1.14 
Central Bank of India 0.31 0.54 0.98 0.52 0.34 0.54 0.44 0.39 0.58 
Corporation Bank 1.31 1.58 1.73 1.19 1.10 1.02 1.1 1.03 1.05 
Dena Bank 0.06 0.57 1.04 0.25 0.27 0.64 0.93 0.87 0.89 
Indian Bank 0.11 0.53 1.04 0.93 1.06 1.35 1.43 1.48 1.53 
Indian Overseas Bank 0.65 1.01 1.08 1.28 1.32 1.23 1.18 1.1 0.54 
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce 0.99 1.34 1.67 1.34 0.95 0.79 0.93 0.79 0.83 
Punjab & Sind Bank 0.17 0.03 0.06 − 0.45 0.57 0.99 1.24 1.04 0.90 
Punjab National Bank 0.77 0.98 1.08 1.12 0.99 0.95 1.03 1.25 1.32 
Syndicate Bank 0.79 1 0.92 0.77 0.88 0.80 0.79 0.7 0.58 
UCO Bank 0.52 0.59 0.99 0.63 0.32 0.42 0.46 0.5 0.74 
Union Bank of India 0.71 1.08 1.22 0.99 0.76 0.82 1.12 1.07 1.06 
United Bank of India 0.52 1.26 1.22 1.03 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.3 0.42 
Vijaya Bank 0.81 1.03 1.71 1.30 0.40 0.78 0.64 0.42 0.72 
SBI &  Its Associates 0.77 0.91 1.02 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.93 0.88 
IDBI Bank … … … 0.38 0.63 0.61 0.56 0.5 0.44 
Average 0.65 0.94 1.17 0.84 0.76 0.84 0.90 0.86 0.86 
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Table 2.2: Net Profit/Total Assets (in percent) of Private Sector Banks   
   Source: Performance Highlights of Private Sector Banks, IBA (Various Issues). 
 
In the pre-reform days, interest rate regulation had been a major hindrance to the development and 
efficient functioning of the banking sector. Competition among banks was virtually absent and the 
nationalized banks were to perform many ‘social duties’. All these were at the cost of profitability 
of the banks and eventually led to cumulative rise in non-performing assets (NPA). In spite of a 
rapid increase in the bank deposits, the profitability was extremely low — the average ROA in the 
second half of 1980s was only about 0.15 percent. In 1992-93, the NPA of public sector banks 
stood at 24 percent of the total loan portfolio. By 1991, the Indian banking sector had become 
Banks 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bharat Overseas Bank 0.80 0.90 1.17 1.25 0.62 0.14 … … … … 
City Union Bank 1.13 1.25 1.23 1.79 1.33 1.36 1.34 1.38 1.32 1.32 
Dev. Credit Bank 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.32 -3.50 -2.27 0.14 0.51 -1.48 -1.28 
Karnataka Bank  0.64 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.17 1.17 1.09 1.25 1.17 0.62 
Lord Krishna Bank 0.34 1.12 1.24 1.01 -0.97 0.14 -0.61 … … … 
Nainital Bank  0.52 0.86 0.98 1.43 1.08 0.92 1.04 1.32 1.48 1.51 
SBI Commercial & 
International Bank -6.32 0.44 -1.45 3.67 -2.10 1.08 1.13 1.93 1.52 0.49 
Tamilnad Mercantile 1.29 1.22 1.35 1.59 1.47 1.65 1.49 1.43 1.34 1.36 
Bank of Rajasthan 0.69 0.78 1.12 0.82 0.38 0.15 0.91 0.73 0.68 -0.59 
Catholic Syrian Bank 0.36 1.03 1.17 1.31 0.24 0.12 0.36 0.61 0.53 0.02 
Dhanalakshmi Bank 0.39 0.52 0.71 0.71 -0.82 0.33 0.47 0.71 1.02 0.29 
Federal Bank 0.66 0.78 0.86 0.90 0.54 1.09 1.17 1.13 1.29 1.06 
Ganesh Bank of 
Kurundwad 0.21 0.50 0.66 0.61 -2.56 … … … … … 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Bank 1.29 1.73 2.01 1.92 0.47 0.66 0.96 1.12 1.09 1.20 
Karur Vysya Bank 1.62 2.03 2.02 2.27 1.34 1.50 1.44 1.41 1.38 1.53 
Lakshmivilas Bank 0.97 1.01 1.06 1.07 0.08 0.45 0.30 0.39 0.61 0.29 
Nedungadi Bank -3.40 0.07 … … … … … … … … 
Ratnakar Bank 0.66 0.99 1.30 1.04 -1.09 0.06 0.26 1.14 1.79 0.92 
Sangli Bank 0.32 0.50 0.64 0.61 … -1.36 -18.8 … … … 
South Indian Bank 0.77 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.09 0.47 0.76 0.89 0.96 0.92 
United Western Bank -0.24 0.45 0.46 0.43 -1.39 -1.48 … … … … 
Vysya Bank 0.33 0.58 … … … … … … … … 
ING Vysya Bank … … 0.75 0.45 -0.25 0.05 0.46 0.61 0.59 0.71 
Bank of Punjab 0.92 0.91 0.74 0.76 -1.25 … … … … … 
Centurion Bank 0.19 -3.80 -0.74 -2.96 0.54 … … … … … 
Centurion Bank of 
Punjab … … … … … 0.77 0.66 0.44 … … 
Global Trust Bank 0.78 0.47 -3.55 -11.2 … … … … … … 
HDFC Bank 1.25 1.19 1.27 1.20 1.29 1.18 1.25 1.19 1.22 1.33 
ICICI Bank 0.79 0.24 1.12 1.31 1.20 1.01 0.90 1.04 0.99 1.11 
IDBI Bank 0.35 0.72 0.89 1.02 … … … … … … 
IndusInd Bank 0.43 0.46 0.91 1.74 1.35 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.54 0.99 
UTI Bank 0.75 0.89 0.98 1.15 0.89 0.97 0.90 0.98 1.23 1.39 
Kotak Mahindra Bank … … 2.08 1.35 1.30 1.16 0.71 1.04 0.96 1.50 
Yes Bank … … … … -0.29 1.32 0.85 1.18 1.33 1.31 
Average 0.67 0.61 0.99 0.95 0.84 0.87 0.86 1.01 1.05 1.13 
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unprofitable, inefficient, and financially weak; Joshi et al. (2003). Following the nationalization of 
banks in 1969, the primary objective was not of attaining efficiency but an increase in deposits 
and loans by way of branch expansion. The banking sector in the recent past has shown stability 
and resilience.vi Amidst the global financial conundrum, Indian banking system was able to 
withstand the shocks of the meltdown mainly due to its strengths, prudential regulations and 
timely interventions by the RBI.  
 
Table 3 shows that banks have been successful in cutting down their operational expenses since 
the initiation of the reform process. Both the bank groups experience a decrease in the cost of 
intermediation by around 38 percent vis-à-vis their 1991 position. While the PSBs took some time 
to adjust to the regulatory changes, the private banks were able to adapt quickly to the new 
business environment. In the recent past, the PSBs had maintained a lower intermediation cost 
than their private sector counterparts implying their relative cost advantage with respect to the 
domestic private banks. 
 
Table 3: Intermediation Cost (as percent of total assets) of SCBs 
 
Year Public Sector Banks (Domestic) Private Banks 
1991 2.36 3.14 
1992 2.47 2.74 
1993 2.51 2.55 
1994 2.51 2.32 
1995 2.69 2.11 
1996 2.84 2.32 
1997 2.69 2.18 
1998 2.52 1.98 
1999 2.65 2.04 
2000 2.52 1.85 
2001 2.59 1.75 
2002 2.28 1.39 
2003 2.24 1.99 
2004 2.21 2.01 
2005 2.05 2.02 
2006 2.05 2.10 
2007 1.77 2.05 
2008 1.54 2.15 
2009 1.47 1.73 
2010 1.46 1.89 
             
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Performance Highlights of Public and Private Sector Banks, IBA (various 
issues).   
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Table 3.1 portrays the improvement in the financial health of the public and private sector banks.vii  
We chose three discrete years [2002, 2006 and 2010] with equal intervals to have a representative 
assessment of the financial performance of the banks over the last decade. In comparison to the 
Basel II norms, we find only the (domestic) private banks to perform above the benchmark in 
2002.viii In the later period, though SBI group have witnessed a fall in the average ROA, it has 
subsequently improved its performance along with the other nationalized banks in 2010. In 
contrast, the private banks as a whole experienced an initial decline in their ROA before 
improving it in 2010. Operating profit declined by 29.34 and 21.67 percent respectively, for the 
SBI group and the private sector banks. However, the nationalized banks recorded an impressive 
growth of 176.47 percent.  
 
Table 3.1: Performance Indicators of Public and Private Sector Banks 
Bank Group 
2002 2006 2010 
ROA Operating Profit (Percent of AWF) ROA 
Operating Profit 
(Percent of AWF) ROA 
Operating Profit  
(Percent of AWF) 
SBI Group 0.95 2.76 0.80 2.25 1.00 1.95 
Nationalized Banks 0.68 1.90 0.85 1.98 0.98 1.88 
Private Banks 1.18 2.63 0.59 1.71 0.94 2.06 
 
   Source: Performance Highlights of Public and Private Sector Banks, IBA (various issues). 
   Note: AWF refers to average working funds defined as fortnightly average of total assets.  
  
3. Mergers &Acquisitions Among Indian Banks 
The M&A scenario in the last decade has been quite prominent as 15 bank mergers and/or 
acquisitions have taken place with at least one merger and/or acquisition every year.ix HDFC, 
ICICI and SBI with two acquisitions each, are the banks that seem to be keen on taking 
advantages of M&A friendly environment witnessed by the banking sector. It is worth mentioning 
that prior to 1999, M&A were resorted to only by the weak banks. During the second decade of 
reforms the banking sector witnessed consolidation even between financially healthy banks; e.g., 
acquisition of State Bank of Indore by SBI.  
 
A larger number of M&A have been voluntary and market driven based on strategic 
considerations.  The share of the public and the private sector banks (as surviving entities) in the 
total number of M&A are 7 and 8, respectively. The private sector banks had a larger share in the 
number of participating banks (acquirer plus target bank) than the PSBs. The decade of 2000-10 
actually saw the re-emergence of consolidation in the banking system in a more pronounced way 
wherein a total of 17 M&A took place. A noteworthy feature of the first phase of financial sector 
reforms (1991-94) is the increased importance of consolidation strategies; for instance, the merger 
of New Bank of India with Punjab National Bank in 1993. There from, the Indian banking sector 
has witnessed a new series of merger & acquisition activities involving both the public sector and 
Indian owned private sector banks. In the public sector, SBI acquired Kashinath Seth Bank in 
1995; Oriental Bank of Commerce acquired Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Bari Doab Bank 
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Ltd. in 1997, and the Global Trust Bank in 2004. ICICI has been a prominent player among the 
Indian owned private sector banks as it has acquired four banks till date, namely, Bank of Madura 
(1997), ICICI Ltd. (1998), Sangli Bank (2007) and the recent one being Bank of Rajasthan (2010).  
Table 4: M&A in the Indian Banking Sector 
Period Number of M&As 
Pre-nationalization: 1961-1968 204 
Pre-liberalization:    1969-1991 15 
                                  
                                 Phase I  [1992-2000] 
Post-liberalization:   
                                 Phase II [2001-2010] 
 
09 
 
17 
Total 245                         
             Source: Report on Trend and Progress in Banking, RBI (various issues).  
 
Note:  The figure for 2001-2010 includes the merger of a foreign bank ING and Vysya Bank and the creation of ICICI 
Bank and IDBI Bank from ICICI and IDBI, respectively.  
 
The prospects of M&A in the Indian banking sector can be seen from two perspectives. One is the 
legal or regulatory framework that have taken place since the herald of gradual liberalization 
during which the restrictions on such activities have been removed or moderated by the policy 
makers. The second perspective is to assess whether the merging banks have reaped any potential 
advantage from such consolidation strategies. To put it differently, there is an imperative to gauge 
the financial position of banks vis-à-vis M&A strategies.  
 
3.1 Issues in Consolidation 
During the first decade of reforms, Avkiran (1999) cautioned the policy makers against any haste 
in facilitating M&A activities as there are inconclusive international evidences of gains reaped 
either by the banks themselves or by their customers. The merging banks were expected to 
improve their financial performance so as to give healthy competition to the big foreign banks in 
near future. In cases where a strong bank is merged with a relatively weak bank, M&A should not 
result in post-merger dilution of the former bank’s efficiency. The surviving banks should be able 
to transfer its managerial and other skills to the acquired units and maintain its pre-merger 
efficiency. Bagchi et al. (2005) argued that M&A should not be aimed at improving the balance 
sheet of the weak banks so as to make them attractive targets by foreign banks that are on 
acquisition spree. Consolidation should not have any adverse effect on credit access to the needy 
section and priority sectors of the society namely, agriculture and SMEs.  
 
There are some differences in opinion about the prospect of consolidation in the Indian banking 
sector. On one hand, there is skepticism and doubts about the viability of M&A activities; and at 
the other end, there are potential gains to be reaped by resorting to M&A strategies. The extant 
literature reveals that the greater degree of stability achieved by the Indian commercial banks has 
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been at the cost of efficiency. See, Das (1997), Basu (2005), Sensarma (2005) and Zhao et al. 
(2010), among others.  
 
Another important issue is the threat of concentration that such consolidation strategies bring 
along. We compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on total assets of the public and 
private sector banks to see if the level of concentration has increased, decreased or remained 
stable following the spate of M&A in the last decade. 
 
Table 5: The HHI Index for Indian Banks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Foreign banks have been excluded from the computation of HHI 
 
It can be said that over the past decade the Indian banking system has been fairly competitive. The 
consolidation process has not adversely affected the level of competition in Indian banking sector 
as the HHI shows a decline in the concentration during the second decade of reforms. The advent 
of new private sector banks has increased competition among the public and (domestic) private 
sector banks as indicated by the fall in the HHI score from 2001 to 2010. The increased 
competitive pressure is likely to affect the profit margin and the cost of intermediation of the 
banks.  
 
4. A Brief Review of Literature 
Most of the studies on banking sector of developing economies had addressed the efficiency 
aspects rather than assessing the impact of M&A. In the Indian context, very few studies have 
appraised the impact of consolidation strategies in the banking sector, though there is considerable 
literature on efficiency aspects. The literature review is divided here into two parts. The first part 
focuses on the efficiency issues of the SCBs and the possible bottlenecks that act as hindrances to 
the performance of Indian banks; and the second part discusses the evidence on M&A and 
efficiency gains that the Indian banking sector has so far witnessed.  
 
Way back in the 1970s, Khusro et al. (1971) indicated that the banks with higher efficiency were 
also the banks with the higher annual growth rate. In the post-reforms period Bhattacharyya et al. 
Year HHI 
2001 0.0879 
2002 0.0825 
2003 0.0798 
2004 0.0730 
2005 0.0689 
2006 0.0634 
2007 0.0627 
2008 0.0625 
2009 0.0672 
2010 0.0619 
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(1997) found that while PSBs could attain higher (technical) efficiency, the private and foreign 
banks secured substantially low efficiency scores. Sathye (2003) found foreign banks to be 
relatively more efficient than their national counterparts in the usage of employees and deposits. 
The dismal performance of the private banks was referred to their expansionary phase with 
relatively higher amount of fixed assets employed. Rationalization of staff and branches were 
suggested to improve the efficiency of banks. Shanmugam et al. (2004) while analyzing the 
technical efficiency of SBI Groups, Nationalized Banks, Indian Private Banks and Foreign Banks 
during 1992 to 1999, indicated that significant difference between banks’ potential and realized 
efficiency to stem from technical inefficiency. Chatterjee et al. (2006) while comparing the 
performance of commercial banks with respect to lending observed that the public sector 
commercial banks lagged behind the private sector commercial banks both in respect of technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency. According to Mahesh et al. (2008) Indian banks in the wake 
of financial liberalization were more efficient in generating deposits than making investments. An 
inspection of the major determinants of in(efficiency) identified bank size and competition as the 
two important factors. The PSBs were found to be more efficient. They suggested mergers to 
happen among the small banks as the bigger banks were found to be scale efficient. Kumar et al. 
(2009) observed majority of PSBs to improve their efficiency during the post-reform phase. The 
banks that were classified as inefficient during the initial years showed higher level of 
improvement in their efficiency vis-à-vis the banks that were efficient at the onset of reforms. 
Zhao et al. (ibid.) found that (cost) efficiency of Indian banks experienced a fall till 1996 and 
increased thereafter. While foreign banks were found to be efficient in the initial years of study, 
later PSBs emerged to be relatively more efficient vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. In another 
recent study by Ray et al. (2010), the high scores of cost efficiency indicated waste minimization 
and appropriate input mix chosen by the banks. The national banks were found to improve their 
profit efficiency over the years. SBI group consistently scored much higher relative to other 
groups by virtue of their exclusive access to most of the government businesses. The foreign 
banks however, had higher profit efficiency scores than the nationalized banks.  
 
M&A in Banking Sector: Evidence from India Data 
Here we briefly review the available studies that have examined the effect of consolidation 
activities on the Indian banks. We could find very few studies that have attempted to appraise the 
impact of M&A on the efficiency of the merged/acquired banks.  
 
Ram Mohan (2005) examined the rationale for consolidation in the Indian public sector banks. 
Among other factors that induced consolidation, deregulation and financial distress were 
recognized as the major drivers of M&A in the banking sector of the emerging economies. The 
author argued that it was essentially due to removal of interest rate ceilings on savings deposits 
that put pressure on bank spreads that forced banks to see M&A as a timely opportunity to offset 
the impact of declining margins on their profitability. Diversification rather than economies of 
scale or scope was suggested to benefit the banks from mergers. Bagchi et al. (ibid.) argued that 
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granting managements the autonomy to undertake domestic and foreign acquisitions would 
improve banks profitability but at the expense of small borrowers and economically backward 
regions of the country.x The authors maintained that mergers among banks should be case based 
and ought to be judged by the business complementarities and synergies of the merging banks. 
M&A among the banks was intended to make the distressed banks financially sound so as to make 
them potential acquisition targets. Gourlay et al. (2006) argued that even if the merging banks 
could not realize the potential gains completely, they still might have got enough efficiency gains 
to have competitive advantage vis-à-vis the non-merging banks. The market driven mergers did 
not provide the merging banks with any competitive edge vis-à-vis the non-merging banks. RBI 
undertook a study in 2008. This study also involved seven select commercial bank mergers.xi 
Although 21 cases of amalgamations had taken place since 1991, the central bank chose only 
those seven banks that were relatively larger in size to assess the impact of such consolidation 
activities on the efficiency of the banks. Out of the seven chosen banks, four were PSB while 
three were from the private sector. A significant improvement in the average ROA among the 
PSBs was observed. In terms of operational cost-assets ratio, three of the four PSBs reported a fall 
while private banks experienced an increase during the post-merger period. Kumar et al. (2010) 
found that the merging banks experienced a fall in their ROA in the post-merger period. Further, 
the ratio of fund-based income to cash flow also decreased in the aftermath of M&A. However, 
after the mergers, banks reported an increase in the ratios of loan to equity and deposit to equity. 
Kaur et al. (2010) analyzed eleven bank mergers of which in eight cases the surviving entity 
happened to be a PSB. The results indicated presence of significant difference between the pre and 
post-merger (cost) efficiency scores of the merged banks. The mergers in which the surviving 
banks happened to be PSBs were forced mergers. On the contrary, all the market driven mergers 
involved private banks as surviving entities. The mergers between strong and weak banks failed to 
translate efficiency gains for the surviving banks. The authors suggested mergers to be undertaken 
only between strong banks and not between strong and weak banks. Market driven mergers were 
found to be successful in improving the efficiency of the merging Indian banks.  
 
Thus we find that some studies have reported efficiency gains in terms of technical, cost, scale or 
profit, for the merging banks. At the same time there are studies that have found no efficiency 
gains bestowed by M&A. There is no clear evidence in the literature of efficiency gains brought in 
by M&A. This motivated us to undertake this study.  
 
5. Research Methodology 
Traditionally finance ratios such as ROA, operating ratio and profitability have been used to 
measure the performance of commercial banks. However, often it is argued that gauging 
performance of the banks based on such ratios could be misleading as these ratios do not capture 
the long-term performance; see for instance Sherman et al. (1985).  In recent times, there is a 
growing trend to explain the performance of the banks using frontier analysis methods, namely 
DEA, SFA, among others. Of late, the usual practice is to use the profitability ratios as 
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supplements to the efficiency scores to look for any significant disagreement in both the aforesaid 
approaches; Sathye (ibid.). Following the major studies in the existing literature, we use DEA to 
estimate efficiency of banks. 
 
5.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric method to estimate various aspects of relative 
efficiency of homogenous decision making units (DMUs). The DEA method pioneered by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) in 1978 was initially applicable to units operating under CRS 
only.xii The modified CCR model was developed by Banker, Charnes & Cooper (BCC) in 1984.xiii 
The BCC (ibid.) model incorporates the assumption of VRS. The input-oriented and output-
oriented measures of technical efficiency (TE) are alternatively called ‘input saving’ and ‘output 
augmenting’ measures of TE, respectively; see Farell (1957), Ray (2004). These alternative 
measures of TE give different results unless the DMU is operating under CRS.xiv 
 
DEA identifies the DMUs into two broad categories: one with none or least wastage of resources 
and the other with the maximum wastage. Once the best-practice banks are identified, DEA makes 
use of them to define a piece-wise linear surface called the efficient frontier. The efficiency of a 
representative DMU falling below the efficiency frontier is calculated relative to those DMUs 
located on the efficiency frontier. The particular DMU that lies below the efficiency frontier is 
then termed as technically inefficient. The best practice DMUs get an efficiency score of 1 
whereas the scores of inefficient DMUs lie somewhere between 0 and 1.  
 
Following Koopmans (1951) an input vector x is technically efficient for the production of an 
output quantity q if by reducing any component of x renders it unfeasible for producing q.xv In 
other words, an input vector x ? L (q) is said to be technically efficient for the production of q if 
there is no x′ ? L (q) with x′ ≤ x. The set of all input vectors that are technically efficient for the 
production of q are denoted by * ( ) :{ ( )  : ' ' ( )}nL q x L q x x x x L q∈ ∈ ≤ ⇒ ∉?  
 
Let there be N DMUs, then the objective of maximizing the technical efficiency of jth DMU can 
be written as:   
1
1
max
M
j j
m m
j m
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j j
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=
=
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where ,j jm ny x  are (positive) known outputs and inputs of the thj DMU, ,
j j
m nu v are weights of the 
variables and subscripts m and n denote the number of outputs and inputs of DMU j . The aim is 
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to find the largest sum of weighted sum of thj DMU while keeping the sum of its weighted inputs 
at the unit value which in turn requires the ratio of the weighted outputs to weighted inputs for any 
other DMU to be less than or equal or 1.  
 
A difficulty with the above formulation is that it can have an infinite number of solutions. That is, 
if ( *, *)u v is a solution then for any 0α〉 , ( *, *)u vα α is another solution. To avoid this, we impose 
the constraint
1
1.
K
j j
n n
n
v x
=
=∑   
 
Charnes et al. (ibid.) further transformed the non-linear programming problem into a linear one as: 
1
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1, 2....,j N= ;  1, 2,....,n K= ; and 1, 2,....,m M=  
 
The above stated formulation yields output-oriented measure of technical efficiency.  
 
We estimate output-oriented technical efficiency scores of the Indian commercial banks. The 
rationale for choosing this approach is that Indian commercial banks have moved on significantly 
from catering to the ‘social duties’ to profit maximizing corporate entities in the post-reform 
competitive world. This is worth mentioning here that in 1991 the SLR in India was 38.5% and 
CRR 15%. Presently, SLR is 24% and CRR below 5% (as of 1st week of June, 2012). With such 
measures from the RBI the commercial banks have sufficient funds at their disposal to be loaned 
out. As the survival of banks depends on their profit potential, commercial banks are on an 
aggressive loan and investment making spree. India being a fast growing economy and having a 
reasonably developed financial market, the commercial banks are faced with the challenge of 
providing the banking needs to the business houses and public in general. Efficiency of banks is 
reflected in the ability of the banks to transform its resources (mainly, deposits) to outputs (loans 
and advances). Thus, we feel that for Indian commercial banks output augmentation is of more 
importance than economizing on the usage of inputs. 
 
5.2 Data and Variables 
This study uses annual data available in various issues of Performance Highlights of Public and 
Private Sector Banks published by Indian Banking Association (IBA).xvi Our study excludes 
foreign banks due to the following reasons. Firstly, foreign banks have relatively smaller share in 
total banking assets and are scarcely present in this vast country.xvii Secondly, there have been 
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very few cases of M&A in this group.xviii Moreover, foreign banks operate under different 
regulatory framework.  
 
We consider the data period 2000-2010 for evaluating post-M&A efficiency of SCBs in India. In 
doing so, we consider the five-year average relative efficiency scores of commercial banks and 
compare the mean pre-M&A relative efficiency score with the post-M&A mean technical 
efficiency score. But unfortunately, we could not find relevant data for the year 2000.xix 
Furthermore, we encounter that for a few banks the figures pertaining to our choice of variables 
were not available for the year 1995. Hence, in order to compute the pre-M&A average relative 
efficiency scores of certain banks we extend our data period backwards to 1994. Data were not 
available for all the banks for all the years due to non-reporting by some of the banks. Therefore, 
the number of banks in the study has varied over the years due to entry of some new banks in the 
private as well as public sector, M&A among the banks apart from non-availability of data for 
certain variables for some years. See Table 7. 
 
In the literature, three approaches have been mentioned with respect to modelling the behavior of 
banks. The first is the production approach that treats banks as any other production unit. The 
second is intermediation approach proposed by Sealey et al. (1977). The intermediation approach 
differs from the production approach as it allows deposits to be treated as an input. Berger et al. 
(1997) suggest that intermediation approach is most appropriate for assessing bank level 
efficiency while the production approach is best suited for analyzing branch level efficiency. The 
third one is modern approach; see Denizer et al. (2007) for more details. In the literature 
intermediation approach has been preferred to model bank behavior. It is essentially because it 
allows interest expenses that comprise a substantial part of banks’ total costs to be used as an 
input. Moreover it is difficult to get data in terms of number of accounts serviced as required by 
the production approach. One more drawback of the production approach is that the number of 
accounts serviced by a bank does not truly reflect the average size of deposits and the associated 
costs of servicing those accounts; see Gilligan et al. (1984). Following Bhattacharyya et al. 
(1997), Avkiran (ibid.), Casu et al. (2002), Sathye (ibid.) and Kumar et al. (2009), among others 
we model the behavior of the Indian commercial banks with intermediation approach.  
Advances and interest income are the two outputs considered while total deposits and 
establishment expenses are the two inputs used. In the context of Indian commercial banks, 
establishment expenses refer to the expenditure incurred on payments to and provisions for the 
employees.  
 
Table 7 reports the total number of banks included in the computation of the efficiency frontier. 
The number of PSBs has remained stable over the years whereas the number of domestic private 
banks changed due to entry of new banks and also due to M&A activities. 
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Table 7: Number of Banks Included in the Efficiency Frontier       
         Note: Recall that we have data unavailable for the year 2000. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
In order to assess the impact of M&A on the surviving bank, we compare the five-year average 
relative efficiency scores before and after the merger and/or takeover. There were a total of 15 
M&A among the public and domestic private sector banks in India during the period 2000-2010. 
Very recently there have been 2 M&A — one between ICICI Bank and Bank of Rajasthan and the 
other between SBI and State Bank of Indore both took place in the year 2010. Hence, we excluded 
them from our study as their post-amalgamation assessment is not possible. There are a few cases 
where one bank has engaged itself into M&A activity more than once in different time periods ⎯ 
for instance, HDFC Bank and ICICI Bank. Whether HDFC has taken over another bank or any 
bank has merged with HDFC we treat such a newly formed unit as a bank itself. 
 
We compute the efficiency of the banks under both common and separate frontier. The common 
frontier refers to inclusion of both the PSBs and the private banks in estimation of the frontier and 
the relative efficiency of a bank is calculated relative to the common frontier. In the separate 
frontier banks of only one group are included at a time in the estimation of the frontier and the 
relative efficiency of a bank is calculated relative to the efficiency of the banks on the efficiency 
frontier.   
 
Coelli et al. (2005) stated that the CRS assumption is appropriate if all the DMUs are operating at 
an optimal scale. If a DMU operates at sub-optimal scale then estimation of TE produces results 
that incorporate scale effects. Banker et al. (ibid.) suggested the assumption of VRS wherein the 
Year Total No. of Banks PSBs (Domestic) Private Sector Banks 
1994 50 27 23 
1995 50 27 23 
1996 59 27 32 
1997 60 27 33 
1998 60 27 33 
1999 60 27 33 
2001 57 27 30 
2002 56 27 29 
2003 57 27 30 
2004 57 27 30 
2005 56 28 28 
2006 54 28 26 
2007 53 28 25 
2008 51 28 23 
2009 49 27 22 
2010 49 27 22 
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efficiency of a DMU is compared to DMUs of similar sizes. A difference between TE scores 
obtained from CRS and VRS assumption indicates scale inefficiency of the DMUs. We have 
estimated efficiency of banks under both these assumptions to check for scale inefficiency of the 
banks. 
 
We judge the success of an M&A based on the following criteria: 
(i) The merging and/or acquiring bank is able to improve its efficiency in the post-M&A 
period vis-à-vis the pre-merger period; and 
 
(ii) The concerned bank’s post-M&A efficiency is higher than that of a defined control 
group. 
 
Common Frontier with CRS 
We begin with output-oriented relative TE of the commercial banks with respect to the common 
frontier. Initially we assume that the banks operate under CRS, though we relax this assumption 
later to explore for any inconsistency in the results also to examine for any possible scale 
inefficiency.  
Table 8.1 reports the pre and post- amalgamation average relative TE of the 13 M&A cases. We 
find that in 8 of the 13 cases efficiency has improved after the consolidation. A close examination 
of the cases reveals that all the 5 cases where TE did not improve after M&A were before the year 
2005. In the later part of the decade banks had become more efficient in their usage of mobilizing 
deposits towards advances.  
 
Out of the 5 unsuccessful M&A, 3 involved acquisition of a private bank by a PSB suggesting that 
difference in the operational environment between the two bank groups could have affected the 
post-merger performance of the PSBs. Further, in 9 of the 13 cases, the acquiring banks were 
more technically efficient vis-à-vis the acquired banks. M&A helped two banks namely IDBI and 
ICICI Bank that were earlier close to the efficiency frontier in their pre-merger years to become 
frontier banks post-merger. Most of the banks are found to have average relative TE scores lie 
below 1 both in the pre and post-M&A years. 
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Table 8.1: Mean Technical Efficiency of Merged/Acquired Commercial Banks 
 
Note: The model estimated is output-oriented DEA. 
Outputs: Advances and Interest Income.  Inputs: Total Deposits, Establishment Expenses. 
 
Common Frontier with VRS 
We now report (Table 8.2) the output-oriented pre and post-M&A average relative TE with the 
relaxed assumption that all the banks may not be operating at their optimal scale. Only 6 banks 
(against 8 banks under CRS) benefitted from M&A; 2 banks, namely ICICI and HDFC 
maintained their pre-merger TE score in the post-merger period as well. All banks secure 
efficiency scores higher than those obtained under CRS. It is because under the VRS assumption, 
DEA compares a bank with an efficient bank of similar size. The difference in the TE score 
Sr. 
No. Name of the Bank 
Year of 
Merger 
Pre-Merger 
TE 
Post-Merger 
TE 
Summary 
Findings 
1.  { HDFC Bank  2000 0.803 0.680 TE ↓ Times Bank  0.778 
2. { ICICI Bank  2001 0.801 0.904 TE ↑ Bank of Madura 0.769 
3. { Bank of Baroda 2002 0.745 0.466 TE ↓ Benaras State Bank  0.638 
4. { Punjab National Bank 2003 0.773 0.554 TE ↓ Nedungadi Bank  0.838 
5. { Oriental Bank of Commerce 2004 0.724 0.599 TE ↓ Global Trust Bank  0.827 
6. { Bank of Punjab  2005 0.878 0.587 TE ↓ Centurion Bank  0.901 
7. { IDBI Bank  2006 0.941 1.000 TE ↑ United Western Bank  0.635 
8. { Federal Bank  2006 0.703 0.722 TE ↑ Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad  0.660 
9. { Centurion Bank of  Punjab 2006 0.363 0.674 TE ↑ Lord Krishna Bank 0.618 
10. { ICICI Bank  2007 0.904 1.000  TE ↑ Sangli Bank  0.498 
11. { Indian Overseas Bank 2007 0.553 0.760 TE ↑ Bharat Overseas Bank  0.531 
12. { HDFC Bank  2008 0.628 0.788 TE ↑ Centurion Bank of Punjab  0.498 
13. { SBI 2008 0.541 0.800 TE ↑ State Bank of Saurashtra 0.520 
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suggests presence of scale inefficiency in the both acquiring and target banks. All 5 banks that 
experienced post-M&A fall in TE under CRS score similar results.  
 
 Table 8.2: Mean Technical Efficiency of Merged/Acquired Commercial Banks 
 
Note: The Model estimated is output-oriented DEA. 
Outputs: Advances and Interest Income.  Inputs: Total Deposits, Establishment Expenses. 
 
Separate Frontier with CRS 
The business environment of the PSBs and private banks is arguably different due to difference in 
technology, operational flexibility among other factors. This prompted us to compute the 
efficiency scores of the banks under separate frontiers. The efficiency frontier of the former 
includes only the public sector banks while that of the latter includes only the private banks. It 
Sr. 
No. Name of the Bank 
Year of 
Merger 
Pre-Merger 
TE 
Post-Merger 
TE 
Summary 
Findings 
1.  { HDFC Bank  2000 0.858 0.811 TE ↓ Times Bank  0.818 
2. { ICICI Bank  2001 0.874 1.000 TE ↑ Bank of Madura 0.814 
3. { Bank of Baroda 2002 1.000 0.676 TE ↓ Benaras State Bank  0.678 
4. { Punjab National Bank 2003 0.941 0.756 TE ↓ Nedungadi Bank  0.845 
5. { Oriental Bank of Commerce 2004 0.912 0.670 TE ↓ Global Trust Bank  0.878 
6. { Bank of Punjab  2005 0.900 0.592 TE ↓ Centurion Bank  0.911 
7. { IDBI Bank  2006 0.946 1.000 TE ↑ United Western Bank  0.653 
8. { Federal Bank  2006 0.725 0.726 TE ↑ Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad  1.000 
9. { Centurion Bank of  Punjab 2006 0.371 0.678 TE ↑ Lord Krishna Bank 0.634 
10. { ICICI Bank  2007 1.000 1.000 TE  Sangli Bank  0.556 
11. { Indian Overseas Bank 2007 0.689 0.762 TE ↑ Bharat Overseas Bank  0.548 
12. { HDFC Bank  2008 1.000 1.000 TE  Centurion Bank of Punjab  0.540 
13. { SBI 2008 0.694 0.814 TE ↑ State Bank of Saurashtra 0.504 
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helps us to check for any significant discrepancy in the results obtained from that under the 
common frontier CRS assumption. 
 
Table 8.3: Mean Technical Efficiency of Merged/Acquired Commercial Banks 
 
 
Note: The Model estimated is output-oriented DEA. 
Outputs: Advances and Interest Income.  Inputs: Total Deposits, Establishment Expenses. 
 
We find that the scores of most of the banks increased under the separate frontier relative to those 
obtained under the common frontier. Only 6 banks witnessed improvement in post-amalgamation 
efficiency scores compared to 8 under the common frontier. IDBI, Federal Bank (FB), ICICI and 
IOB witnessed post-M&A increase whereas HDFC and PNB witnessed fall in TE. ICICI is the 
only common bank to report post-amalgamation increase in efficiency scores. Similarly HDFC 
and PNB are the ones to experience decline in their relative mean efficiency scores.  
 
 
 
Sr. 
No. Name of the Bank 
Year of 
Merger 
Pre-Merger 
TE 
Post-Merger 
TE 
Summary 
Findings 
1.  { HDFC Bank  2000 0.803 0.736 TE ↓ Times Bank  0.778 
2. { ICICI Bank  2001 0.801 1.000 TE ↑ Bank of Madura 0.773 
3. { Bank of Baroda 2002 0.950 0.642 TE ↓ Benaras State Bank  0.663 
4. { Punjab National Bank 2003 0.877 0.615 TE ↓ Nedungadi Bank  0.800 
5. { Oriental Bank of Commerce 2004 1.000 0.642 TE ↓ Global Trust Bank  0.827 
6. { Bank of Punjab  2005 0.878 0.827 TE ↓ Centurion Bank  0.901 
7. { IDBI Bank  2006 0.941 1.000 TE ↑ United Western Bank  0.703 
8. { Federal Bank  2006 0.771 0.783 TE ↑ Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad  0.724 
9. { Centurion Bank of  Punjab 2006 0.853 0.815 TE ↓ Lord Krishna Bank 0.694 
10. { ICICI Bank  2007 1.000 1.000 TE  Sangli Bank  0.542 
11. { Indian Overseas Bank 2007 0.712 0.930 TE ↑ Bharat Overseas Bank  0.683 
12. { HDFC Bank  2008 0.800 0.788 TE ↓ Centurion Bank of Punjab  0.837 
13. { SBI 2008 0.692 0.899 TE ↑ State Bank of Saurashtra 0.669 
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Separate Frontier with VRS 
We find that ICICI, IDBI, and SBI witness an increase in their post-M&A efficiency level 
whereas HDFC, PNB and FB report a decline in both the efficiency aspects. FB, CBP and HDFC 
that had experienced improvement in TE (post-M&A under the common frontier), now witness 
decline in their efficiency level. We find that for HDFC and PNB, post-amalgamation efficiency 
decline under both common frontier with both CRS and VRS assumptions. 
 
Table 8.4: Mean Technical Efficiency of Merged/Acquired Commercial Banks 
 
Note: The Model estimated is output-oriented DEA. 
Outputs: Advances and Interest Income.  Inputs: Total Deposits, Establishment Expenses. 
 
 
 
 
Sr. 
No. Name of the Bank 
Year of 
Merger 
Pre-Merger 
TE 
Post-Merger 
TE 
Summary 
Findings 
1.  { HDFC Bank  2000 0.844 0.838 TE ↓ Times Bank  0.796 
2. { ICICI Bank  2001 0.834 1.000 TE ↑ Bank of Madura 0.818 
3. { Bank of Baroda 2002 1.000 0.713 TE ↓ Benaras State Bank  0.684 
4. { Punjab National Bank 2003 0.927 0.810 TE ↓ Nedungadi Bank  0.814 
5. { Oriental Bank of Commerce 2004 1.000 0.745 TE ↓ Global Trust Bank  0.873 
6. { Bank of Punjab  2005 0.905 0.831 TE ↓ Centurion Bank  0.914 
7. { IDBI Bank  2006 0.947 1.000 TE ↑ United Western Bank  0.729 
8. { Federal Bank  2006 0.789 0.787 TE ↓ Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad  1.000 
9. { Centurion Bank of  Punjab 2006 0.856 0.819 TE ↓ Lord Krishna Bank 0.721 
10. { ICICI Bank  2007 1.000 1.000         TE  Sangli Bank  0.564 
11. { Indian Overseas Bank 2007 0.775 0.931 TE ↑ Bharat Overseas Bank  0.708 
12. { HDFC Bank  2008 0.816 0.809 TE ↓ Centurion Bank of Punjab  0.844 
13. { SBI 2008 1.000 1.000         TE  State Bank of Saurashtra 1.000 
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Comparison with the Control Group 
 
In this section we assess the extent to which M&A were able to benefit the merging banks relative 
to their non-merging counterparts. It is possible that M&A might not have benefitted banks in 
terms of efficiency enhancement in the post-M&A vis-à-vis their pre-M&A efficiency levels but 
still it could have enabled the bank to gain competitive advantage relative to those banks that did 
not opt to expand via the inorganic routes. To perform the analysis we construct a control group 
consisting of such banks that did not participate in any M&A activity for fifteen years before the 
year of post-M&A comparison. The post-M&A average efficiency (five years after the M&A) of a 
merged bank was compared to the average efficiency of the control group (CG). For example, the 
first M&A took place in 2000 — we compare the average efficiency of the bank five years after 
its M&A with the average efficiency of the control group in 2005. The control group constructed 
for the year 2005 consists of such banks that did not participate in any M&A since 1990. 
Similarly, the control group constructed for the year 2006 comprises of such banks that did not 
participate in any M&A since 1991 and so on. The composition of the control group varied over 
the years due to two reasons; one because of entry and exit of banks in the banking system; second 
due to imposition/lapse of the constraint on the banks pertaining to participation in M&A activity.   
 
It may be recalled that success of a M&A is measured subject to two criteria — bank’s post-M&A 
TE is greater than its pre-M&A TE; bank’s post-M&A TE exceeds that of a defined control group. 
If a surviving bank fulfills both the criteria, we term the M&A as successful one, if it fulfills any 
one of the two criteria we call it as partial successful and if it fails in both, we call it as an 
unsuccessful M&A.  
 
The M&A Matrix 
 
In the above matrix, Quadrant I denotes M&A that achieve the dual success of improving the 
post-M&A TE of the surviving banks and also gives it competitive advantage over its non-
merging counterparts. Those M&As that fail to improve the post-M&A efficiency of the surviving 
banks but increase the banks efficiency relative to the non-merging banks lie in the Quadrant II. 
Such M&As that failed to improve the post-M&A efficiency relative to both the pre-M&A 
Quadrant IV 
 
Post-M&A < Control Group  
but Post-M&A > Pre-M&A 
 
(Partially Successful) 
Quadrant I 
 
Post-M&A > Control Group 
and Post-M&A > Pre-M&A 
 
(Successful) 
 
Quadrant III 
 
Post-M&A < Control Group  
and Post-M&A < Pre-M&A 
 
(Unsuccessful) 
 
Quadrant II 
 
Post-M&A > Control Group 
but Post-M&A < Pre-M&A 
 
(Partially Successful) 
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efficiency level and the efficiency level of the control group fall in Quadrant III. Lastly, the 
Quadrant IV contains such M&A that helped the surviving banks to increase their post-M&A 
efficiency vis-à-vis their pre-M&A efficiency scores but failed to provide an edge over the non-
merging banks. The average efficiency scores of the control group were calculated from efficiency 
scores obtained under both CRS and VRS respectively.  
 
Table 9:  Average Post-M&A Efficiency of the Control Group 
Efficiency 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TECRS 0.502 0.437 0.575 0.710 0.711 0.788 
TEVRS 0.591 0.490 0.626 0.731 0.728 0.811 
 
We compare the technical efficiency scores (both under CRS and VRS) obtained under the 
common frontier only. Matrix 1 shows that 4 cases of M&A involving ICICI*, IDBI, ICICI** and 
SBI were fully successful with an equal number of unsuccessful M&A involving BoB, PNB, OBC 
and CBP*. In 4 cases involving FB, CBP**, IOB and HDFC**, consolidation increased the post-
M&A average relative efficiency from the pre-M&A level but the banks faired below the average 
efficiency level of the control group. In only 1 case pertaining to HDFC*, the post-M&A 
efficiency increased relative to the control group but not to its pre-M&A level. Overall M&A have 
been successful for the surviving banks as 9 banks (successful plus partially successful) witnessed 
efficiency gains in the aftermath of M&A.  
 
 
Table 10:  List of DMUs 
DMU No. DMUs Year of Merger 
1. HDFC* 2000 
2. ICICI* 2001 
3. Bank of Baroda (BoB) 2002 
4. Punjab National Bank (PNB) 2003 
5. Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC) 2004 
6. Centurion Bank of Punjab (CBP)* 2005 
7. IDBI 2006 
8. Federal Bank (FB) 2006 
9. Centurion Bank of Punjab (CBP)** 2007 
10. ICICI** 2007 
11. Indian Overseas Bank (IOB) 2007 
12. HDFC** 2008 
13. State Bank of India (SBI) 2008 
 Note: * indicates the 1st M&A by the DMU. ** indicates the 2nd M&A by the same DMU.  
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M&A Matrix 1: Technical Efficiency of DMUs under CRS 
 
 
M&A Matrix 2 displays no change in the positions of the respective DMUs even after the change 
in the returns to scale assumption. 
 
M&A Matrix 2: Technical Efficiency of DMUs under VRS 
 
Therefore, M&A have bestowed more or less success to many of the merging and/or acquiring 
banks; however, all the banks have not been able to reap efficiency gains from their consolidation 
strategies. While IDBI, ICICI and SBI witnessed most successful amalgamation, Bank of Baroda, 
Punjab National Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce and Centurion Bank of Punjab are the four 
banks that experienced unsuccessful M&A. 
   
7.  Summing Up 
One of the outcomes of the financial sector reforms process in India is the resurgence of M&A in 
the banking sector. In the initial years of reforms, M&A mostly took place between weak and 
relatively strong banks; e.g., merger of New Bank of India with Punjab National Bank. Since 2000 
the banking sector has witnessed consolidation among the financially healthy banks as well, e.g., 
amalgamation of Bharat Overseas Bank with Indian Overseas Bank.  
 
We compared the pre and post-amalgamation technical efficiency of 13 commercial banks that 
participated in M&A activities in the first decade of the 21st Century. The mean technical 
efficiency of the banks when computed with respect to the common frontier under the assumption 
Quadrant IV 
 
FB, CBP**, IOB, HDFC** 
 
(Partially Successful) 
 
Quadrant I 
 
ICICI*, IDBI, ICICI**, SBI 
 
(Successful) 
 
Quadrant III 
 
BoB, PNB, OBC, CBP* 
 
(Unsuccessful) 
 
Quadrant II 
 
HDFC* 
 
(Partially Successful) 
 
Quadrant  IV 
 
FB, CBP**, IOB, HDFC** 
 
 (Partially Successful) 
 
 
Quadrant I 
 
ICICI*, IDBI, ICICI**, SBI 
 
 (Successful) 
 
Quadrant III 
 
BoB, PNB, OBC, CBP* 
 
 (Unsuccessful) 
 
Quadrant  II 
 
HDFC* 
  
 (Partially Successful) 
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of CRS, we found that 8 banks witnessed post-M&A mean efficiency improvement. However, 
most of the surviving banks are found to be relatively inefficient! While the pre-M&A five-year 
average relative TE of 9 banks lie between 0.363 to 0.803; the post-M&A average relative TE of 
10 banks lie between 0.466 and 0.8. Further, in 9 out of 13 M&A cases the acquiring banks were 
more technically efficient vis-à-vis the acquired banks. A close examination reveals that all the 5 
banks where mean TE did not improve after consolidation were before the year 2005. In the later 
part of the decade banks have gained efficiency in their usage of mobilizing deposits towards 
advances.  
 
When the assumption of CRS was changed to VRS, we found 7 banks to improve their post-M&A 
mean technical efficiency. Under the separate frontier with CRS, 6 banks witnessed improvement 
in post-M&A TE; whereas under the relaxed assumption of VRS, 5 banks improved their post-
M&A technical efficiency.  
 
We also judged the success of an amalgamation also with respect to a defined dynamic control 
group consisting of non-merging banks. We found 4 banks to be successful and 8 to be partially 
successful. Bank of Baroda, Oriental Bank of Commerce and Centurion Bank of Punjab are the 
three banks that had unsuccessful amalgamation whereas IDBI, ICICI and SBI witnessed success 
mostly.  
 
However, not all banks are able to benefit from consolidation. M&A among the banks should be 
case specific and based on the potential synergy gains and the associated threats for the merging 
banks. It is yet to be ascertained a priori if M&A are the best ways to consolidate before preferring 
it over other ways of restructuring. In addition, the M&A environment in the Indian commercial 
banking sector should not culminate in market concentration. The evidence till now does not 
indicate an increase in market concentration as along with the exit of several banks due to 
consolidation, 12 new banks were set up in the past two decades. 
 
Availability of data pertaining to our choice of variables for the banks that underwent 
consolidation during the period 1991-1999 would have enabled us to enlarge the sample size and 
hence a more conclusive set of results could have been obtained. Also, we could not segregate the 
impact of successive M&A activities on efficiency of a bank. For instance, ICICI Bank acquired 
Bank of Madura in 2001 and Sangli Bank in 2007. The post-M&A efficiency scores of ICICI after 
it acquired Sangli Bank can confound the impact of acquiring the Bank of Madura as well. With 
DEA we could not segregate such impacts. 
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Endnotes 
                                                            
i See, India’s Financial Sector: An Assessment, Overview Report, Vol. II, RBI (2009). 
ii See, Performance Highlights of Public and Private Sector Banks for 2009-2010, IBA. 
 
iii The 7 new private sector banks had an average ROA of 1.09 percent compared to 0.84 percent earned by the PSBs 
in 2010. The ratio of interest expenses to total expenses was 60.53 percent and 68.8 percent for the private and public 
sector banks, respectively; the Capital Adequacy Ratio was 17.32 percent and 13.72 percent, respectively for the same 
year. See, Performance Highlights of Public and Private Sector Banks, IBA (2010).  
iv The data for the year 2001 was not available for net profit so we extended the 2nd assessment point by a year. 
v Bharat Overseas Bank was acquired by Indian Overseas Bank in 2007, Lord Krishna by Centurion Bank in 2008, 
Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad by Federal Bank in 2006, Nedungadi Bank by Punjab National Bank in 2003, Sangli 
Bank by ICICI in 2007, United Western Bank by IDBI in 2006, Vysya Bank was acquired by ING in 2002, Bank of 
Punjab and Centurion Bank merged to form Centurion Bank of Punjab in 2005 and Global Trust Bank by Oriental 
Bank of Commerce in 2004. Hence figures for these banks are not available for the post-merger years. IDBI became a 
PSB in 2004. 
 
vi The Banking Stability Index points to a healthy improvement in the stability of the banking sector over the past few 
years. See, the Financial Stability report, RBI (2010).  
vii Return on Assets (ROA) is considered to be the best measure of a bank’s overall performance; Sinkey (1983).  
viii As per BASEL II norms ROA of banks should exceed 1 percent; Ghosh et al. (2004). 
ix It excludes the M&A between foreign banks and Indian owned banks (e.g., merger of ING with Vysya Bank in 
2002) and also the M&A involving only the foreign banks. 
x  Dymski (1999) stated that megamergers of banks in USA succeeded in improving banks’ profitability by 
marginalizing 20 percent of the population from banking services. 
xi The study is contained in Report on Currency and Finance, RBI (2008). 
xii Banker et al. (1984) extended the original CCR model to make it applicable to technologies characterized by 
variable returns to scale. 
xiii There is another variant of the DEA model developed by Bogetoft et al. (2005). 
xiv If a firm is operating under CRS, then the average productivity of the firm at two different points on the production 
frontier would be the same. 
xv Conventionally, efficiency of a firm is reflected by its success in producing maximum possible output from a given 
vector of inputs; see Farell (1957), Ray (2004), among others. Alternatively, Ramanathan (2003) defines technical 
efficiency of a firm as the ratio of output to input.  
xvi IBA annually publishes various reports on the Indian Banking sector  that contain useful information on a wide 
range of variables such capital adequacy, advances, deposits, etc. Some other reports are, Indian Banking at a Glance, 
Consolidation in the Indian Banking Sector among others. 
xvii Foreign banks as a whole had just 310 offices in the country during 2009-10 compared to 43,187 and 10,387 
offices of nationalized and Indian owned private sector banks respectively. Their share in the total deposits, total 
advances and total investments during 2009-10 stood at 5 percent, 4.6 percent and 9.26 percent respectively; see A 
Profile of Banks, RBI (2009-10). 
xviii Standard Chartered acquired Grindlays Bank in 2000, ING Bank of Netherlands and Vysya bank of India merged 
in 2002 and recently HSBC acquired RBS’s retail and commercial units in 2010. 
xix We also looked in to ‘Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India,’ (various issues) by RBI, but could not 
find the required data in it as well. 
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